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In recent years, the legal academy has begun to tell itself the story of how 
and why legal theory was marginalized in the wake of critical legal studies and 
the theory debates of the 1970s and 1980s. Despite the volume of work written 
on the subject and the many anxieties expressed about the (im)possibility of 
critical legal theory’s revival, the narratives of what led to this juncture are 
deeply conflicted. There is even debate about what precisely has been lost. 
Some argue that it is just the very visible, radical critical legal studies movement 
that has passed from the legal theory scene.1 Others contend the leftist project 
more generally has run out of steam.2 And still others assert that theory has 
been marginalized within the humanities and social sciences as well, making the 
disappearance of legal theory just one instance of this larger trend.3 
What seems beyond dispute is that “legal theory is out.”4 Comparing the 
current intellectual climate with the pervasive interest in theoretical approaches 
in the preceding decades, Duncan Kennedy remarks that “legal theory has lost 
the fairly central place it held in legal consciousness and legal discourse in the 
period from the late fifties up to the nineties . . . . It has been eclipsed, in a sense 
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 1.  See, e.g., JAMES R. HACKNEY, LEGAL INTELLECTUALS IN CONVERSATION: REFLECTIONS ON 
THE CONSTRUCTION OF CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN LEGAL THEORY (2012) (In the introduction to 
his book of interviews with the seminal figures in legal theory, James Hackney contends that the critical 
tradition is alive and well and that it has merely moved beyond the abstract theory debates of the 1970s 
and 1980s and into a more pragmatic orientation that is less visible.); Mark Tushnet, Critical Legal 
Theory (without modifiers) in the United States, 13 J. POL. PHIL. 99, 107 (2005) (arguing that it is merely 
the spectacle of CLS that has disappeared and many critical scholars are still actively writing and 
teaching). 
 2.  See, e.g., Peter Gabel, Critical Legal Studies as Spiritual Practice, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 515, 528 
(2008) (“[I]nfluencing the dissipation of the movements themselves was the collapse of socialism and 
the Marxism that had supported it, which for 150 years provided the principal metaphor for the morally 
transcendent communal horizon against which the shortcomings of the present society had been 
measured.”); William H. Simon, Fear and Loathing of Politics in the Legal Academy, 51 J. LEGAL 
EDUC. 175, 179 (2001) (arguing that “things might have been different [if] there [had] been a strong 
liberal or left political movement open to alternative programmatic thinking”). 
 3.  See, e.g., HACKNEY, supra note 1, at 111 (quoting Austin Sarat). Austin Sarat, one of the 
central figures in the Law and Society movement, states that legal theory’s decline should be 
understood as part of the larger death of metatheory. Id. 
 4.  Id. at 43 (quoting Duncan Kennedy). 
BLALOCK_FORMATTED_CHANTBOX 12/3/2014  2:08 PM 
72 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 77:71 
even discredited.”5 The theoretical conversations that defined those final 
decades of intellectual foment were driven largely by the “crits”6—an umbrella 
term that covers three distinct groups of scholars: critical legal studies (CLS) 
scholars, critical race theory (CRT) scholars,7 and feminist legal theorists.8 CLS 
emerged as a loosely defined movement of young leftist legal academics, 
educated at Harvard and Yale Law Schools in the late 1960s.9 CRT and feminist 
legal theory emerged in the 1980s to address the notable gaps and biases 
regarding race and gender in both the dominant discourse and CLS.10 These 
three critical movements challenged the law’s neutrality and critiqued the 
discourse within the legal academy: a form of left-of-center liberalism that 
professed faith in rights, equality, and the courts as mechanisms for progressive 
social change.11 Though one can certainly debate the effectiveness or validity of 
these critiques, it is undeniable that they took aim at the heart of liberalism.12 
And yet, in recent years, scholarship that continues in these modes does not 
appear to have the same impact. The narratives accounting for this loss of 
vitality are as contradictory as they are ubiquitous—“victory through 
incorporation” exists alongside “failure to provide an alternative.” Each 
proposes that something has changed—the legal academy, the critical project, 
or the political climate—but all assume that legal liberalism is still the relevant 
paradigm. 
However, neoliberalism, not liberalism, is now the dominant paradigm of 
legitimacy. And one cannot understand the narratives of decline, nor the decline 
itself, without first accounting for the rise of neoliberalism. Moreover, by not 
recognizing neoliberalism’s logic, critical legal scholars fail to challenge it and 
risk further implicating law and legal theory in neoliberalism’s legitimation. 
Under neoliberalism, the measures and values of the market are used to 
index the success of the state and its citizens. Diverging from the constitutional 
 
 5.  Id. 
 6.  This period also saw the emergence of the “law and ___” movements, including law and 
society, law and literature, law and psychology, and, of course, law and economics, all of which 
contributed to the robust intellectual climate. 
 7.  CRT emerged in the mid-1980s as a critique of liberalism’s cautious approach to racial equality 
and its blind eye toward issues of institutional racism. CRT also aimed to expose the complicity of law 
in the continued subordination of racial minorities. Some of the more prominent scholars associated 
with the movement include: Richard Delgado, Jean Stefancic, Derrick Bell, Angela Harris, Cheryl 
Harris, Patricia Williams, and Kimberle Williams Krenshaw. 
 8.  Feminist legal theory also emerged in the 1980s in part in response to the limits of equality 
advocacy in the fight against gender subordination. Prominent feminist legal scholars include: Janet 
Halley, Catharine MacKinnon, Katharine Bartlett, Mari Matsuda, and Martha Fineman. 
 9.  The founding and central members of the movement are identified as Duncan Kennedy, David 
Trubek, Mark Tushnet, Mark Kelman, Karl Klare, Morton Horowitz, Peter Gabel, and Roberto Unger. 
 10.  See NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 504–09 (1995) (describing 
the tensions and divergence in method among CLS, CRT, and feminist legal scholars). 
 11.  HACKNEY, supra note 1, at 29 (Duncan Kennedy asserts that “[CLS] was not about fighting 
Nixon; it was about being against the people in legal academia and in the culture in general who are the 
dominant intellectual forces and were way to the left of Nixon. The idea is, the word is, radical.”). 
 12.  See infra Part II. 
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ideal that state power derives from consent by and representation of the people, 
the state’s authority is both founded on and progressively limited to its ability to 
guarantee proper conditions for economic activity and individual prosperity. 
Correspondingly, the democratic will of the people is cast as irrelevant to 
economic affairs and as harmful if mobilized to intervene in pursuit of social 
goals. As Margaret Thatcher declared, in perhaps the most famous articulation 
of neoliberal ideology, “There is no such thing as society.”13 The market-model 
of choice and efficiency is extended to the level of the individual. Market-
inflected cost-benefit analysis figures all human pursuits as “conducted 
according to a calculus of utility, benefit, or satisfaction against a 
microeconomic grid of scarcity, supply and demand, and moral value-
neutrality.”14 
In failing to recognize neoliberalism, the narratives of decline provide useful 
insights into understanding it. First, reading the narratives symptomatically 
illustrates just how deeply the logic of neoliberalism has penetrated the legal 
discourse. Second, it illustrates the consequences for critical legal theory of 
failing to identify the shift produced by neoliberalism. It also offers a way into 
an important conversation regarding the failure of legal discourse generally to 
address neoliberalism. And finally, examining these narratives forces one to 
recognize that neoliberalism is not strictly a conservative ideology, but a 
postpolitical discourse that progressive scholars also inhabit.15 
This article proceeds in seven parts. Following the introduction, part II 
describes the crits’ central critiques and their relationship to liberalism. Part III 
briefly recounts the narratives that the legal academy has constructed to explain 
(away) the marginalization of critical legal theory, showing how each provides a 
piece of the puzzle yet fails to fully account for the whole. 
Part IV provides a more substantive definition of neoliberalism and uses the 
concept of hegemony to show how neoliberal thought has become 
simultaneously ubiquitous and largely invisible. Part V uses this understanding 
of neoliberalism to recast the narratives of decline, showing how each is 
symptomatic of neoliberalism’s rationality. Part VI illustrates how the 
prescriptions for countering legal theory’s marginalization fit within the logic of 
neoliberalism, undermining their power and relevancy. Part VII concludes with 
an argument about the need to develop a critique of neoliberalism internal to 
law and legal theory moving forward. 
 
 13.  Margaret Thatcher, Interview for Woman’s Own (Sept. 23, 1987), available at 
http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/106689. 
 14.  Wendy Brown, Neoliberalism and the End of Liberal Democracy, in EDGEWORK: CRITICAL 
ESSAYS ON KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 37, 40 (2005). 
 15.  Highlighting the postpolitical nature of neoliberalism’s rationality, radical leftist scholars from 
Duncan Kennedy to Catharine MacKinnon advocate for law and economics as a methodology for the 
left. See HACKNEY, supra note 1, at 30, 140. 
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II 
THE CRITS AND THE CRITIQUE OF LIBERALISM 
The crits16 took aim at “democratic liberalism” as a model of state power 
and critiqued, as its essential adjunct, “legal liberalism,” or faith in the ability of 
the law and the courts to at once transcend and discipline politics.17 There were 
numerous critical veins running through the crits’ scholarship, each gaining 
theoretical traction by demystifying and directly challenging some central 
aspect of liberalism, but four dominated. CLS shared the first three veins in 
common with CRT and feminist legal scholarship. These included the 
indeterminacy critique, the refutation of the law–politics distinction, and the 
debunking of the myth of the autonomous legal subject. The final vein, an 
emphasis on class relations, material inequality, and Marxist theory, was largely 
unique to CLS. 
In the first critical vein, the crits demonstrated that legal principles could be 
used to justify almost any outcome such that judges could not reach decisions 
based on legal doctrine alone; their scholarship illustrated this by using the 
same legal principles to arrive at different outcomes. The “indeterminacy 
critique,” as it was referred to, directly countered the liberal model of judicial 
reasoning according to which judges merely applied the law and precedent so as 
to arrive at a single incontrovertible answer.18 
The second critical assertion—that “law is politics” and not a wholly 
separate realm or a truly distinct form of reasoning—likewise took aim at the 
inherent assumptions of liberalism. Liberal theory grounds the state’s 
legitimacy in democratic accountability and the ability of individuals to come 
together, as equals, to institute a collective vision of the common good. Insofar 
as liberalism also offers itself as “a government of laws, and not of men,”19 it 
entails a model of legal, as well as political, legitimacy. Legal liberalism is the 
corresponding belief that the courts are the means by which the values of 
liberty, autonomy, and rights-based equality can be preserved when impinged 
by the political system.20 Although democratic accountability is heralded as the 
legitimating force behind the Constitution itself, the courts’ legitimacy is 
established by other means: through their separation from politics. Legal 
liberalism thus places law above politics and culture. The crits rebuked the 
 
 16.  I use the term “crits” to demarcate the scholarship that was being done during the 1970s and 
1980s in critical legal theory by CLS, CRT, and feminist legal scholars. I refer to legal scholars currently 
working in the critical vein simply as “critical legal scholars.” Likewise, I use “critical legal theory” to 
indicate the practice of critique more generally, not the historically specific moment of the crits. 
 17.  See LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM 1–10 (1998) (defining 
legal liberalism in the wake of the Warren Court as centered around the belief that the courts were a 
primary and effective means of furthering progressive values of liberty and equality). See also id. at 85–
86 (describing CLS scholars’ critique of legal liberalism and the rights discourse). 
 18.  Pierre Schlag, Critical Legal Studies, in THE OXFORD INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
LEGAL HISTORY 295, 296 (Stanley N. Katz ed., 2009). 
 19.  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803). 
 20.  See KALMAN, supra note 17, at 2. 
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embrace of these ideas as apologias for the status quo and argued that these 
ideas were complicit in masking the deep injustices created through law. They 
illustrated that law was political in the sense that it was neither neutral nor 
objective, but instead embodied a particular set of beliefs and furthered a 
particular set of interests—white, male, heteronormative, ruling-class values—
that actually perpetuated the subordination of other groups in society.21 It is 
precisely through law’s claims of neutrality and autonomous choice, the crits 
argued, that racial and gendered hierarchies are maintained. One of the crits’ 
most powerful critiques, therefore, was to assert the materialism that the liberal 
discourse elided. They exposed the distance between formal and substantive 
equality, and the degree to which legal formalism and the rights discourse 
papered over and perpetuated these forms of subordination.22 
Relatedly, the third critical vein of crit scholarship challenged the legal 
discourse’s claims of universality, including the figure of the autonomous, 
rational legal subject.23 Liberal subjects, the crits argued, are determined by 
structures outside of their control. They are divided, gendered, sexualized, and 
racialized, and understand and experience the law as such.24 
Finally, CLS in particular foregrounded law’s role in the creation and 
maintenance of class inequality and, in so doing, took up the legacy of Robert 
Hale and the more radical legal realists to illustrate that economic relations of 
power were not only maintained but also created by the law.25 From Hale, CLS 
took the idea that every private right should be viewed as entailing a 
corresponding deprivation and therefore constituting a public regulation as 
much as any legislative act of taxation or redistribution.26 
III 
NARRATIVES OF THE DECLINE OF LEGAL THEORY 
Accounts of legal theory’s apparent decline are varied and contradictory. 
They differ not only over whether critical legal theory “won” or “lost” but also 
over whether the dissipation of its more radical elements is something to be 
grateful for or the source of its decline. In this part, I briefly sketch four of the 
more prominent narratives, illustrating why each appears to be incomplete. 
 
 21.   Schlag, supra note 18, at 296–98.  
 22.  See, e.g., Alan Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination through Antidiscrimination Law: 
A Critical Review of Supreme Court Review, 62 MINN L. REV. 1049 (1978). 
 23.  See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, The Stakes of Law, or Hale and Foucault, 15 LEGAL STUD. F. 327 
(1991). 
 24.  See Jack M. Balkin, Understanding Legal Understanding: The Legal Subject and the Problem of 
Legal Coherence, 103 YALE L.J. 105 (1993–94); James Boyle, Is Subjectivity Possible?: The Postmodern 
Subject in Legal Theory, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 489 (1991) (highlighting the need to problematize the 
subjective experience of law). 
 25.  See generally Kennedy, supra note 23. 
 26.  Schlag, supra note 18, at 297. 
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A. We Won, Or, Victory Through Incorporation 
One account is a story of triumph: success and institutionalization stole the 
momentum away from the political and intellectual struggles embodied by the 
crits.27 This narrative of success is a particularly common articulation of the fate 
of what Mark Tushnet terms “Critical Legal Theory without modifiers,” a 
phrase he employs to exclude critical race and feminist scholars.28 According to 
Tushnet, the critical insights of CLS have been rendered less visible as a distinct 
form of scholarship because they have been embraced by the legal academy at 
large.29 He argues that nostalgia for the earlier, more radical iterations of these 
critical projects is misguided because the muted forms they now take are closer 
to CLS’s true message.30 The inflammatory rhetoric of the earlier moment was 
mere strategy for attracting attention to a critical approach formerly wholly 
outside the mainstream.31 In the wake of institutional victory, the crits have 
been able to do away with this stratagem and still retain the true goals of these 
projects. 
Tushnet’s narrative at first appears credible. With the notable exception of 
the more radical conservative theories, some degree of indeterminacy in law is 
indeed widely accepted as self-evident.32 Therefore, he is right to claim that law 
is no longer thought of as something wholly separate from politics. Most 
contemporary legal theories recognize politics as influencing legal outcomes 
within a zone of discretion created by the law itself (although debates persist 
over the precise size of the gap for such discretion left by texts and precedent). 
In light of this change, the victory narrative seems like a plausible 
explanation, but it leaves one with an uncomfortable question: if the crits 
“won,” why does that victory feel so hollow? 
If one delves deeper into Tushnet’s particular claims of victory, it becomes 
readily apparent just how hollow this supposed “victory” is. Tushnet begins his 
 
 27.  See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 1; Peter Goodrich, Sleeping with the Enemy: An Essay on the 
Politics of Critical Legal Studies in America, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 389, 390–92 (1993) (Asserting a distinct 
and more pessimistic narrative about the effects of “success,” Goodrich argues that CLS appeared and 
subsequently disappeared as “the fashionable pedagogy of an institutional elite or high clergy, 
concerned not so much with a culture of the Left as with the preservation and reproduction of its own 
institutional place and status.”). 
 28.  Tushnet, supra note 1, at 107. In essence, “critical legal theory without modifiers” is just the 
school of thought I have designated as CLS. 
 29.  Id. at 100. 
 30.  Tushnet all but apologizes for the radicalness of CLS’s claims, stating that they were 
“[o]verstated, I suspect, to get people’s attention and dislodge them from [their] nervous complacency.” 
Id. at 105 n.23. 
 31.  Id. See also Louis Michael Siedman, Critical Constitutionalism Now, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 
575, 591 (2006) (“Critical constitutionalism in the twentieth century was often marked by a kind of 
brash in-your-faceism . . . [which] was perhaps necessary to shake up a sleepy constitutional 
establishment. In any event, whether because we are all older and wiser, or whether because the 
situation has changed, this rhetoric does not seem necessary now.”). 
 32.  See generally Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CAL. L. REV. 465 (1988) 
(highlighting the extent to which almost all major schools of thought in the legal academy accept the 
limits of formalism). 
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argument with the claim that the CLS principle “law is politics” has been 
accepted, only to subsequently qualify that it has been accepted in a “scaled-
back” form, and then ultimately to retreat to the position that the commonly 
held belief that “courts and legislatures mix arguments of principle and 
arguments of policy in somewhat different proportions” is “not inconsistent 
with the critical legal theorists’ early formulations.”33 The absence of explicit 
inconsistency is hardly a powerful claim of incorporation. 
Furthermore, to claim victory for the crits based on the incorporation of the 
indeterminacy critique is to reduce CLS to legal realism—and not to the radical 
realism of Felix Cohen and Robert Hale, but to the broad legal realism that also 
includes law and economics and other theoretical movements toward which 
CLS originally positioned itself in opposition. Only the first of these forms of 
legal realism focuses on law’s role as an instrument of class power. Notably, in 
crafting this narrative of success and incorporation, Tushnet does not mention 
CLS’s focus on class and material inequality, despite its prominence among the 
scholars “without modifiers.”34 He has to skirt the issue in order to maintain his 
claim of incorporation. 
This tendency to conflate CLS’s project with legal realism in a way that 
eschews the critique of class relations is not Tushnet’s alone; claims of victory 
for critical legal theory are frequently tied to the oft-quoted mantra “we are all 
legal realists now.” Meanwhile, class has completely fallen out of the theoretical 
conversation. Although critical race theory and feminist legal scholarship 
continue to foreground issues of race and gender within legal scholarship, issues 
of class are not incorporated in the theoretical discourse but relegated to the 
clinics in the form of “poverty law.” This signifies a dominant understanding 
that poverty is a problem to be addressed through policy and advocacy, not 
through structural changes in legal thought. Therefore, to see CLS as “winning” 
requires thinking about CLS’s projects only formally while ignoring that the 
substance of these projects has not been taken up. In light of this limitation on 
any claim of victory, it is perhaps unsurprising that the most common narrative 
of what happened to the crits is a story of failure. 
B. Failure, Or, Mired In Nihilism 
In direct contradiction to Tushnet’s story of success and incorporation is the 
more prominent narrative of failure. The crits’ failure is accounted for at three 
levels of generality in the narratives of decline: at the level of CLS, at the level 
of theory as such, and at the level of the leftist political imaginary (both inside 
and outside the legal academy).35 At each level, the critical legal project is 
 
 33.  Tushnet, supra note 1, at 107. 
 34.  See generally id. 
 35.  One can see all three levels of this analysis in Philip Bobbitt’s recent characterization of the 
fate of CLS: 
[CLS] began as a Marxist movement just when Marxist regimes were being dismantled, wall 
by wall, barbed wire and all, in revulsion by those very persons they claimed to serve . . . . CLS 
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characterized as unable to escape the negative mode of critique to offer a 
generative alternative. 
The narrowest articulation asserts that CLS disappeared because of its 
ultimately sterile commitment to a negative mode of critique.36 Its 
disappearance was inevitable according to some because critical legal 
scholarship simply did not, and arguably could not, provide an answer to the 
question, “What would you put in its place?”37 And so the story goes, the legal 
academy eventually tired of CLS’s relentless critique of liberalism’s 
contradictions and power relations. 
At the next level of generality, the decline is characterized as 
disillusionment, not with legal theory specifically, but with theory as such to 
provide alternatives. In other words, the decline of legal theory is seen as 
another casualty of the more general death of metatheory in the postmodern 
era.38 Unlike earlier iterations of the radical legal tradition, the crits did not 
ground their critiques in a systematizing alternative vision of law.39 Even the 
critical project itself sought to undermine the idea that the solution would be 
found through theory—that it might lie just beyond the next hermeneutic bend. 
Poststructuralist theory, in which many of the crits’ projects were grounded, 
could not make any sort of claim without immediately undercutting it through 
critique, and so it ultimately descended into (un)critical nihilism.40 
At the most general level, this entrenchment in negativity is seen as bound 
up with a historical crisis of the leftist political imaginary at the end of the 
twentieth century. After the fall of communism, the story goes, the left was 
incapable of imagining an alternative to the model of democratic market-
 
then attempted to transform itself through dalliances with existentialism, decisionism, 
structuralism, and eventually postmodernism, chasing the avant garde and arriving only to 
find its new partner was already passé. 
Philip C. Bobbitt, Age of Consent, 123 YALE L.J. 2334, 2356 (2014). 
 36.  HACKNEY, supra note 1, at 231 (interviewing Jules Coleman) (Legal philosopher Jules 
Coleman remarks, “Critical legal studies died because nihilism only takes you so far. You have to have 
something that you stand for as opposed to all the things that you stand against.”). 
 37.  Richard Michael Fischl, The Question that Killed Critical Legal Studies, 17 LAW & SOC. 
INQUIRY 779, 780 (1992). 
 38.  HACKNEY, supra note 1, at 111 (interviewing Austin Sarat) (Austin Sarat states that in 
explaining the decline “you can generalize beyond the legal academy. It’s the death of meta-theory. It’s 
the exhaustion of meta-theory. There are no more Foucaults and Derridas, who everybody’s reading, 
everybody’s thinking about.”). 
 39.  Adam Gearey, Anxiety and Affirmation: Critical Legal Studies and the Critical “Tradition(s)”, 
31 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 585, 592–93 (2006) (CLS was philosophically rooted in the works of 
Nietzsche, Freud, Foucault, Derrida, Lacan, and Levinas, none of which grounded a totalizing 
alternative vision for law offered at an earlier moment by the Marxist and existentialist traditions.). 
 40.  Paul Carrington famously claimed critical legal scholars “had an ethical duty” to take their 
nihilistic scholarship and “depart the law school.” Kalman, supra note 17, at 121. See also Paul D. 
Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 222, 227 (1984) ("The professionalism and 
intellectual courage of lawyers . . . . cannot abide . . . the embrace of nihilism . . . . Teaching cynicism 
may, and perhaps probably does, result in the learning of the skills of corruption: bribery and 
intimidation. In an honest effort to proclaim a need for revolution, nihilist teachers are more likely to 
train crooks than radicals."). 
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capitalism that had been the object of the crits’ critique.41 This inability to 
imagine an alternative—experienced by the left as a cessation of progress and 
as an inability to escape the realities of the present moment—is oftentimes 
referred to as the “end of history.”42 
The confluence of these layers of negativity admittedly makes it easy to 
dismiss the crits as victims of postmodern and leftist disillusionment. However, 
one could argue that the crits did, in fact, offer alternatives.43 But even setting 
that aside, one should hesitate before accepting this narrative of failure as 
conclusive. Is the legal academy really prepared to accept that critical insights 
about the legal structure “lack significance and are just not meaningful if [they] 
don’t propose some means of escape from those underlying structures?”44 
One should challenge the idea that offering a normative alternative is the 
goal and measure of legal theory (and of CLS in particular).45 The demand for 
an alternative can be seen as part of the devaluation of the critical project and 
part of the paradigm that the crits were attempting to subvert.46 Moreover, there 
is an inherent absurdity to the premise that, in order to critique the current 
paradigm (i.e., liberalism or law), one has to be able to provide an alternative to 
law or liberalism itself. 
C. Specialization Or Balkanization? 
CLS was the first of the critical fields to emerge, but it was followed closely 
by the splintering off of CRT and feminist legal theory. This differentiation into 
three distinct fields has been given two distinct valences by scholars narrating 
the crits’ decline. The negative valence, which I term the “balkanization 
narrative,” focuses on the primary rupture between CLS, CRT, and feminist 
legal theory as destroying the critical mass necessary for a viable leftist critical 
movement to continue. The positive valence, which I term the “specialization 
narrative,” asserts that the division of the critical projects into subdisciplines 
 
 41.  Joanne Conaghan, The Left: In Memoriam?, N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 455, 455 (2007) 
(“It is popular nowadays to view the left as a hangover from a bygone era, a politics that collapsed 
along with the Berlin wall and that, like Humpty Dumpty, can never be put together again.”). 
 42.  “End of history” is a characterization popularized by neoconservative political scientist Francis 
Fukuyama who argued that liberal democracy was the end point of human history, and that even 
though other forms of society would persist, after the fall of communism they could no longer maintain 
“their ideological pretensions of representing different and higher forms of human society.” FRANCIS 
FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN (1992). This insight about the apparent 
closing of the historical horizon after the fall of communism was also taken seriously on the left, 
especially in the Marxist tradition. See generally Perry Anderson, The Ends of History, in A ZONE OF 
ENGAGEMENT (1992). 
 43.  See Robert W. Gordon, American Law Through English Eyes: A Century of Nightmares and 
Noble Dreams, 84 GEO. L.J. 2215, 2240–41 (1996) (pushing back against the familiar critique that CLS 
failed to provide concrete constructive alternatives, using the work of Duncan Kennedy and William 
Simon to support this claim but also listing the work of many others). 
 44.  Fischl, supra note 37, at 800. 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  Id. at 802 (“[T]he question itself presupposes virtually every assumption about law and legal 
scholarship that [CLS was] attempting to bring to the surface and to call into question.”). 
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and their movement into doctrinal areas of law has merely given the illusion of 
decline while actually representing a proliferation of theory. 
1. Balkanization 
CRT and feminist legal theory developed in part as a reaction to the silences 
regarding race and gender in the supposed radical legal discourse of CLS.47 
According to the balkanization narrative, the internal divisions and 
interpersonal hostilities among CLS scholars, feminist theorists, and critical race 
scholars led to infighting and ultimately to the destruction of the only hope for a 
viable legal left.48 Fueling this narrative was the spectacle of some of the early 
conflicts and divisions that played out at conferences and between the pages of 
prominent law journals.49 
This balkanization narrative does not explain the full extent of the perceived 
decline. If the introduction of CRT and feminist legal theory is what killed CLS, 
why do CRT and feminist scholars also lament the declining relevance of their 
theoretical projects? In contrast to CLS, critical race and feminist legal scholars 
still have an institutional presence in the legal academy, albeit a narrowly 
circumscribed one, with most law schools incorporating race and gender classes 
into their curriculums. Despite this institutional incorporation, scholars in these 
fields claim that there has been a “brain drain” over the last twenty years. 50 For 
instance, Janet Halley, a prominent feminist legal scholar, remarks in her book 
(in which she advocates “taking a break from feminism”) that “women 
complain to [her] that academic feminism has lost its zing [and that many of the] 
key intellectual figures in feminism have decamped to other endeavors.”51 
Furthermore, Richard Posner, despite working in law and economics (the 
school of thought that emerged whole, and arguably triumphant, from this era), 
also identified this sense that legal theory generally has lost its vibrancy.52 
Therefore, these divisions among the crits clearly do not account for the whole 
 
 47.  DUXBURY, supra note 10, at 504–09. According to many accounts of this rupture, including 
Duxbury’s, CRT’s split centered on disagreement with CLS’s rights critique and the desire for scholars 
of color to hold onto the legacy of civil rights movement. Richard Delgado, a prominent CRT theorist, 
commented that the average CLS scholar “has little use for rights . . . [r]arely is he the victim of 
coercion, revilement or contempt.” Id. at 505 (citing Richard Delgado, The Ethereal Scholar: Does 
Critical Legal Studies Have What Minorities Want?, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 301, 305–06 (1987)). 
 48.  Admittedly, this balkanization narrative is more often focused on the fate of CLS than legal 
theory generally or even critical legal theory. 
 49.  For example, “[t]he 1995 conference on CLS and class at Georgetown (jointly sponsored by 
Georgetown and American) ended with various walkouts, over disputes between CLS and Critical 
Race Theory.” ROBIN WEST, NORMATIVE JURISPRUDENCE: AN INTRODUCTION 115 n.33 (2011). 
There was also a public and acrimonious dispute between Mark Tushnet and Gary Peller in the pages 
of the Georgetown Law Review. See Mark Tushnet, The Degradation of Constitutional Discourse, 81 
GEO. L.J. 251 (1992) (offering a critique of identity-based scholarship); Gary Peller, The Discourse of 
Constitutional Degradation, 81 GEO. L.J. 313 (1992) (defending identity-based scholarship); Mark 
Tushnet, Reply, 81 GEO. L.J. 343 (1992) (criticizing the defense). 
 50.  JANET HALLEY, SPLIT DECISIONS: HOW AND WHY TO TAKE A BREAK FROM FEMINISM 340 
(2006). 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  HACKNEY, supra note 1, at 60. 
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story. 
2. Specialization 
The positive valence of the differentiation narrative asserts that, although 
legal theory appears to have receded, the theoretical projects have simply 
particularized by moving into doctrinal scholarship and various theoretical 
subfields. Accordingly, those that perceive a decline are merely mistaking the 
death of “grand” legal theory for the death of legal theory more generally; the 
decline of legal theory as a stand-alone discipline does not entail the decreased 
relevance of theoretical methods to legal scholarship. On the contrary, this 
specialization narrative contends that theory is more relevant now than it was 
during its highly visible period because it is being brought directly into 
conversation with discussions of legal doctrine and therefore not subject to the 
charge of being “merely academic” exercise.53 In essence, critical scholars may 
have “decamped,” but they took their theories with them. 
James Hackney Jr. offers a characteristic example of this narrative in the 
introduction to a recent collection of interviews he conducted with the central 
figures in legal theory about the current state of the field.54 Hackney asserts that 
the proliferation of fields has indeed undermined the lively debates of the 1970s 
and 1980s, but only insofar as theoretical conversations have become self-
contained as each subfield is now equipped with its own journals, conferences, 
and internal debates (not confronted with and perhaps not even aware of the 
theoretical debates internal to another subfield).55 He argues that metatheories 
necessarily conflicted and confronted one another because they were all laying 
claim to the same theoretical terrain. Now each theoretical enterprise merely 
concerns itself with its own clearly defined terrain and none is claiming 
transcendent status. Hackney, therefore, attributes the perception of theory’s 
decline to a lack of interchange now that each theoretical subfield has found its 
niche.56 
Beyond the evolution of subfields, Hackney argues that this lack of debate 
can be further explained by the fact that theoretical projects have become 
internal to doctrinal areas of law (which were traditionally viewed as separate 
from legal theory in the legal academy). Hackney describes the current status of 
legal theory as “like a toolkit” available within doctrinal areas of law, as 
opposed to constituting a separate jurisprudential conversation.57 In this 
account, the crits have just concretized and particularized their scholarship by 
developing praxis as opposed to totalizing theories—their theoretical debates 
are now internal to their doctrinal area but all the more forceful and relevant 
because of it. 
 
 53.  Id. 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  Id. 
 56.  Id. 
 57.  Id. at 44. 
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Hackney’s account is appealing, but it begs the question of how to define 
critical legal theory itself. Are these subfields and only-as-applied iterations 
really a preservation of the critical legal project? Or are they something else 
entirely? Duncan Kennedy takes up Hackney’s metaphor of the “toolkit” to 
respond. The transformation of theories into “tools,” Kennedy argues, indicates 
that once vibrant and generative theoretical debates have been reduced to 
reified forms that can be invoked instrumentally—divorced from their context 
and nuance.58 Extending Hackney’s metaphor, Kennedy adds sardonically that 
in today’s legal academy “it’s not necessary to be particularly proficient with 
any of the tools.”59 
D. Legal Theory Lost Its Way 
For others, the decline of legal theory is less a question of legal theory 
having won or lost than it is of it having lost its way.60 These scholars, many of 
whom were allied with the crits, argue for an internal cause of decline: the 
critical legal projects evolved in such a way that they lost their radical or 
normative edge and, as a result, fail to meaningfully challenge the status quo. 
For example, Robin West contends that critical legal scholars, due to an 
overzealous and exclusionary preoccupation with the theories of Michel 
Foucault, became too focused on the critique of the “identity-based” and “left-
centrist” projects and regrettably deemphasized state power.61 Most damning in 
West’s opinion is that this Foucauldian preoccupation precluded legal scholars 
from making moral claims, and consequently critical legal scholarship has failed 
to challenge the dominant modes of power.62 In direct contrast to Tushnet’s 
claim that the radical rhetoric fell away to reveal the true stakes and nature of 
the crits’ project, West argues that it is precisely because critical legal theory 
abandoned its radical and utopic orientation that it lost its vitality.63 Peter Gabel 
echoes West’s concerns, indicting CLS for having “lost track of [its] spiritual 
and moral foundation.”64 
On one level, I agree: critical legal scholarship has lost its way—schools of 
thought and theoretical movements that once appeared vibrant no longer do. 
The error, however, was not in deviating from the clearly radical path, as West 
claims, but in continuing to stay on the same path as the world around critical 
legal theory changed. 
 
 58.  Id. 
 59.  Id. 
 60.  See, e.g., Gabel, supra note 2, at 528 (“CLS ‘stopped,’ or perhaps ‘paused,’ about fifteen years 
ago because it lost track of this spiritual and moral foundation.”). 
 61.  ROBIN WEST, NORMATIVE JURISPRUDENCE: AN INTRODUCTION 116–17 (2011). 
 62.  Id. at 165 (“Foucault’s broad claim regarding the omnipresence of power is what eventually 
emasculated the moral critique.”) 
 63.  Id. at 154–56. 
 64.  Gabel, supra note 2, at 528. 
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IV 
NEOLIBERALISM AND HEGEMONY 
The change that legal theory failed to recognize was the rise of 
neoliberalism.65 The rule of law under neoliberalism is not designed to allow 
individuals to enact a collective vision of society; rather, it is first and foremost 
designed to enable individuals to plan their actions according to market logic.66 
In this part, I offer a brief definition of neoliberalism, highlighting the ways in 
which it redefines legal legitimacy and other concepts central to political 
liberalism and the legal discourse. I then argue that neoliberalism is now 
hegemonic—it is not one theoretical account among many but, like liberalism 
before it, a set of principles and modes of governance so ingrained as to 
constitute the common sense of the age. 
A. Defining Neoliberalism 
1. Historical Instantiation 
Neoliberalism is perhaps most readily associated with its historic emergence 
in the policy platforms of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan, and with the 
subsequent iteration of market fundamentalism known as the “Washington 
Consensus.”67 These regimes focused their political platforms on deregulation, 
the creation of stable and well-protected private-law systems, and the 
dismantling of the welfare state—shifting the primary role of government from 
public law to private law.68 
This shift is particularly evident in the law and development context. In 
 
 65.  See Daria Roithmayr, A Dangerous Supplement, 55 J. LEGAL EDUC. 80 (2005) (observing that 
critical legal scholars have failed to account for the rise of law and economics and the ways in which the 
legal discourse has changed in a globalized world). 
 66.  David Trubek & Alvaro Santos, Introduction: The Third Moment in Law and Development 
Theory and the Emergence of a New Critical Practice, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 1 (David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006) (arguing 
that the rule of law is no longer just an instrument of development, but is now seen as constitutive of 
development and thus an end in itself). See also F.A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 75–76 
(Routledge Classics, 2001). 
 67.  See David Harvey, Neoliberalism as Creative Destruction, 610 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & 
SOC. SCI. 22 (2007) (offering detailed and insightful account of neoliberalism’s historic emergence 
under Reagan and Thatcher). Regarding the Washington Consensus, see John Williamson, What 
Washington Means by Policy Reform, in LATIN AMERICAN READJUSTMENT: HOW MUCH HAS 
HAPPENED? 5–20 (John Williamson ed., 1989). Williamson, an economist, coined the term 
“Washington Consensus” in an article describing the economic policies routinely prescribed by 
Washington to set Latin American countries’ “houses in order” in the wake of the Latin American debt 
crisis. Id. at 7. The consensus Williamson describes is between the “political Washington” of Congress 
and the White House, and the “‘technocratic Washington’ of international financial institutions, the 
economic agencies of the US government, the Federal Reserve Board, and think tanks.” The ten policy 
instruments Williamson identifies as routinely prescribed include: deregulation, austerity measures, 
privatization, and trade policy. Id. at 7–18. 
 68.  David Kennedy, The ‘Rule of Law,’ Political Choices, and Development Common Sense, in 
THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 95, 138 (David M. Trubek 
& Alvaro Santos eds., 2006). 
BLALOCK_FORMATTED_CHANTBOX 12/3/2014  2:08 PM 
84 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 77:71 
contradistinction to political liberalism, the development focus under 
neoliberalism is “less legislative positivism and sovereignty than private rights 
and neoformalism about the limits of public law.”69 For example, during the 
postwar liberal consensus, law was seen as “subordinate to social purposes—
implementing, fulfilling, and accomplishing the objectives of the society, rather 
than expressing a priori limits or historic commitments to be respected or 
purposes of its own to be achieved.”70 But with the advent of the Washington 
Consensus, law was relegated to well-defined tasks—the creation of stable and 
well-protected property rights, enforcement of private contracts, and limitation 
of the arbitrary exercise of government power—enabling a particular ideal of 
entrepreneurial liberty, not visions of society.71 
It is also important to note that the emergence of neoliberalism is 
historically intertwined with the processes of globalization.72 The increased flow 
of global capital and the lowering of barriers to trade and communication are 
material changes inextricable from many of the ideological developments 
surrounding the role of the nation-state examined in this article.73 
2. As A Political Rationality 
Neoliberalism as a political rationality, not a historical development, is what 
is of particular importance for understanding the decline of legal theory.74 
Neoliberalism is more principled and totalizing than a mere policy platform, but 
it is also not reducible to a set of philosophical ideas; it is embodied in the mode 
 
      69.    Id. 
 70.  Kennedy, supra note 68, at 102. See also David M. Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-
Estrangement: Some Reflections on the Crisis in Law and Development Studies in the United States, 1974 
WIS. L. REV. 1062, 1073 (1974) (“[Development under liberalism] offered more than increased 
rationality and material satisfaction; it also promised greater equality, enhanced freedom, and fuller 
participation.”) (footnotes omitted). 
 71.  Kennedy, supra note 68, at 128–37 . 
 72.  Stuart Hall, et al., After Neoliberalism: Analysing the Present, 53 SOUNDINGS 8, 10 (2013) 
(“The particular global character of neoliberalism was part of its initiating armoury—for instance 
through the Washington Consensus from the 1980s onwards—and it is also an element of its historical 
specificity.”) Unfortunately, globalization, a contested concept in its own right, is beyond the scope of 
this article. However, it too needs to be incorporated into the theoretical conversation; legal theory has 
not fully accounted for the more concrete changes brought about by this paradigm shift either. See 
generally Ralf Michaels, Globalisation and Law: Law Beyond the State, in LAW AND SOCIAL THEORY 
287–303 (Reza Banakar & Max Travers eds., 2013) (illustrating that globalization has not been 
sufficiently accounted for or incorporated into legal thought and examining possible reasons for its 
exclusion). 
 73.  In particular there is a changing role for the nation-state in the globalized world. For example, 
in relation to transnational corporations, if the primary responsibility of the sovereign is to preserve 
market stability and growth, its ability to exert power against a corporation is limited by the potential 
harm to the economy if that corporation leaves to find in pursuit of a more favorable regulatory 
environment. 
 74.  A “political rationality” refers to the discursive logic that legitimates exercises of power—it 
structures the common language of policy debates as well as limits the field of possible government 
action. It extends beyond the traditional concept of the state and focuses instead on Michel Foucault’s 
concept of “governmentality,” which encompasses a much broader understanding of the relationship 
between thought and the exercise of power. 
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of governance. It is a set of principles that have been so incorporated into the 
experience of the world that the dominant discourse no longer sees them as 
points of contention. As I argue below, this is what it means to recognize 
neoliberalism as hegemonic: it has become the common sense of the current 
moment, and as a result, many of its assumptions have been rendered invisible 
in the literature. 
Although neoliberalism has only attained hegemonic status in the last thirty 
years, the foundational tenets of its current iteration grow out of the much 
earlier work of Friedrich Hayek. I engage with Hayek’s work directly for two 
reasons. First, Hayek remains one of the strongest and most cogent defenders 
of neoliberal rationality.75 Second, Hayek lays out explicitly what has become 
implicit or assumed in the current discourse. Silences occur insofar as any 
paradigm becomes hegemonic and constitutes the common sense of an era. 
Looking at the current discourse in light of Hayek’s work will therefore render 
its underlying rationale visible.76 
a. Circumscribed role for the state—Hayek’s view of the cosmos. In 
founding the neoliberal thought collective, Hayek and the other members of the 
Mont Pelerin Society did not intend to revive classical economic liberalism 
unchanged. For one, under neoliberalism the government has an active role in 
supporting the market and correcting market failures, diverging from the 
government’s role in classical laissez-faire economics. Neoliberalism is also 
distinct insofar as it portrays both the market and rational economic behavior as 
requiring the law and “the dissemination of social norms designed to facilitate 
competition, free trade, and rational economic action on the part of every 
member and institution of society” to function properly.77 To fully understand 
these differences, one must begin with Hayek’s vision of civil society and the 
state. 
In Law, Legislation, and Liberty, Hayek describes civil society and the 
market as “spontaneous orders” (or cosmos) to indicate that, despite being 
products of human action, they are not the product of human design.78 The 
complexity of these systems, he argues, is beyond the capacity of human 
 
 75.  PHILLIP MIROWSKI & DIETER PLEHWE, THE ROAD FROM MONT PELERIN: THE MAKING OF 
THE NEOLIBERAL THOUGHT COLLECTIVE 158 (2009) (describing Hayek’s role in founding both the 
Chicago School and the Mont Pelerin Society). 
 76.  Conaghan, supra note 41, at 465 (“The neoliberal guru Friedrich Hayek began writing in the 
1940s and 1950s, developing the theoretical ideas that were eventually to form the basis of 
neoliberalism—ideas that were widely regarded as wholly unacceptable in the political environment of 
post-war Keynesian welfarism.”) (footnotes omitted); see also Susan George, A Short History of 
Neoliberalism: Twenty Years of Elite Economics and Emerging Opportunities for Structural Change, in 
GLOBAL FINANCE: NEW THINKING ON REGULATING SPECULATIVE CAPITAL MARKETS 27, 27 (2000). 
 77.  Brown, supra note 14, at 41. See also STUART HALL, THE HARD ROAD TO RENEWAL: 
THATCHERISM AND THE CRISIS OF THE LEFT (1988) (a remarkable account of the extent to which 
Margaret Thatcher appropriated culture and society as a political battleground). 
 78.  F.A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION, AND LIBERTY, VOL. 1: RULES & ORDER 38 (University of 
Chicago Press, 1981) [hereinafter HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION, AND LIBERTY, VOL. 1]. 
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knowledge, such that one cannot know the impact of attempts to intervene or 
change a spontaneous order.79 Thus, the market should be seen as a highly 
interdependent and balanced ecology that even well-intentioned, seemingly 
benign projects can harmfully disrupt. Consequently, Hayek argues, 
government should never intervene directly in the logic of the market because it 
can “never be aware of all the costs of achieving particular results by such 
interference.”80 Implicit in this formulation is the idea that even noneconomic 
social programs may have economic consequences that cannot be known ex 
ante, and so Hayek concludes, it “is not in our power to build a desirable society 
by simply putting together the particular elements that by themselves appear 
desirable.”81 And, with that, the Hayekian model refutes not the desirability of 
pursuing loftier social goals, but the possibility of pursuing that common good 
effectively, especially with regard to material inequality. According to this 
theory, the role of law and its goals must remain formal—never substantive. 
Governmental pursuit of substantive ideals, even if widely shared, leads to 
market inefficiencies and other unintended consequences. Hayek famously 
cautioned, “the sources of many of the most harmful agents in this world are 
often not evil men but highminded idealists.”82 
In Hayek’s framework, therefore, the law is subordinated to the market.83 
Law builds the architecture for the market but does so responsively to this 
naturally occurring order. Or, to put it another way, government makes the 
legal framework but not as it pleases. Under neoliberalism the central question 
for national policy to determine is “which government actions support[] and 
which impede[] market activity, and to prioritize and order market supporting 
initiatives in the most effective way.”84 
Hayek’s metaphor of civil society as a factory illustrates law’s subordinate 
role in his theory very clearly. In this passage, he emphasizes the importance of 
law, stating that its coercive function makes law more than just another part of 
the factory’s machinery; it establishes law as a condition for the preservation 
(and optimization) of that order.85 However, in extending this metaphor, he 
analogizes the proper role of the state not to the managers in the factory (as one 
 
 79.  Id. at 51 (The limits of human knowledge, Hayek argues, are even more pronounced when 
diffused among members of a government structure). 
 80.  Id. at 57. 
 81.  Id. at 56 (“From the insight that the benefits of civilization rest on the use of more knowledge 
than can be used in any deliberately concerted effort, it follows that it is not in our power to build a 
desirable society by simply putting together the particular elements that by themselves appear 
desirable.”). 
 82.  Id. at 70. 
 83.  This provides Hayek’s definition of the rule of law: “Stripped of all technicalities [the Rule of 
Law] means that government in all its actions is bound by rules fixed and announced beforehand—rules 
which make it possible to foresee with fair certainty how the authority will use its coercive powers in 
given circumstances, and to plan one's individual affairs on the basis of this knowledge.” HAYEK, supra 
note 66, at 75–76 (citing A.V. Dicey’s THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION). 
 84.  Kennedy, supra note 68, at 132. 
 85.  HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION, AND LIBERTY, VOL. 1, supra note 78, at 47–48. 
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might expect), but to the maintenance workers, stating, government’s role, like 
the maintenance worker’s, does not entail production of any particular goods or 
services for the citizens. The role of law is “rather to see that the mechanism 
which regulates the production of those goods and services is kept in working 
order.”86 
b. Legitimacy and dedemocratization. The neoliberal framework, 
premised on the impossibility of enacting a collective substantive vision, clearly 
cannot ground the state’s legitimacy in democratic authority and pursuit of the 
common good the way liberalism does. The state’s legitimacy, therefore, is 
“based upon its ability to create conditions for individual flourishing.”87 The 
government’s role regarding the market is not always to stay its hand, in 
contrast to the model in classical economic liberalism. The metric for measuring 
the sovereign becomes the degree to which the sovereign successfully fulfills 
this role of not interfering until such a time as the market dictates state 
intervention is necessary to preserve individual liberty. 
This model of legitimacy is not only a deviation from the ideal of democratic 
authority but is actively hostile to the intervention of democratic will in certain 
areas. Governance by majority rule is seen as a potential threat to individual 
rights and constitutional liberties. Democracy is viewed as a luxury, only 
possible under conditions of relative affluence coupled with a strong middle-
class presence to guarantee political stability.88 What can be left to democratic 
politics is therefore limited, and an ever-increasing number of areas are seen as 
the exclusive province of private individuals or the technocratic administrative 
state.89 
c. No society, just individuals—no demos, just an aggregate. The shift from 
the collective to the individual as the unit of governance entails a shift from a 
representative democracy to an aggregate one. To again quote Margaret 
Thatcher, “There is no such thing as society.”90 The subject that Thatcher 
envisioned for Britain is an entrepreneur capable of making her own way, and a 
consumer who rationally chooses among a set of options, not a citizen who joins 
with other citizens to pursue a vision of society. This is in accordance with 
Hayek’s theory: The individual is capable of pursuing only her own interests 
because the limits of human knowledge are such that she cannot take the 
interests of others into account. If everyone pursues their own interests, the 
 
 86.  Id. at 47. 
 87.  WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE & JOHN A. FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE NEW 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 149 (2006) (describing this change as a slide into the “consumerist 
constitution”). 
 88.  Harvey, supra note 67, at 66. 
 89.  Kanishka Jayasuriya, Globalization, Sovereignty, and the Rule of Law: From Political to 
Economic Constitutionalism? 8 CONSTELLATIONS 442, 453–54 (2001) (Neoliberal constitutionalism 
seeks to put “certain market regulatory institutions beyond the reach of transitory political majorities . . 
. . developing a politics of anti-politics.”). 
 90.  Thatcher, supra note 13. 
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story goes, the market will function efficiently (not be distorted) and will result 
in a just allocation.91 Competition is the central virtue, and solidarity among 
individuals is a sign of weakness and a manipulation of that virtuous form.92 
The role of the state vis-à-vis the individual is likewise recast. With this 
neoliberal conception of the subject comes the assumption that the subject 
alone bears responsibility for the consequences of her actions. In this culture of 
personal responsibility, the subject’s “moral autonomy is measured by [her] 
capacity for ‘self-care’—the ability to provide for [her] own needs and service 
[her] own ambitions.”93 The neoliberal model of choice does not recognize the 
material constraints that limit an individual’s choices because those constraints 
are seen as merely the product of her previous choices. The government is 
limited to enabling people access to the markets such that they can use their 
own skills and abilities to pursue their own interests. The state is not 
responsible if individuals do not properly respond to the market’s incentive 
structures, but it is responsible for the pernicious consequences of sheltering 
individuals from the market’s disciplinary effects.94 President Reagan, 
accordingly, decried social welfare as a program “enacted in the name of 
compassion that degrade[s] the moral worth of work, encourage[s] family 
break-ups, and drive[s] entire communities into a bleak and heartless 
dependency.”95 
B. Neoliberal Hegemony 
Given that the historic rise of neoliberalism (conceived as a series of policies 
and political projects) coincided directly with the halcyon days of critical legal 
theory in the 1970s and 1980s, how can I contend that it also explains the loss of 
the crits’ vitality in subsequent decades? The answer is through an 
understanding of hegemony.96 It is not the particular instantiations of neoliberal 
thought that critical legal theory has failed to apprehend and address,97 but 
rather, its hegemonic nature. With a few notable exceptions,98 the critique of 
 
 91.  See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 60–72 (1981). 
 92.  PHILIP MIROWSKI, NEVER LET A SERIOUS CRISIS GO TO WASTE 92 (2013). 
 93.  Brown, supra note 14, at 42. 
 94.  Margaret Thatcher once declared, “Economics are the method; the object is to change the 
heart and soul.” Interview for Sunday Times, Mrs. Thatcher: The First Two Years (May 1, 1981), 
available at http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/104475. 
 95.  Ronald Reagan, State of the Union Address (Feb. 4, 1986), available at 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=36646. 
 96.  During the Reagan–Thatcher era, neoliberalism was the dominant paradigm but was not yet 
hegemonic. Stuart Hall, Authoritarian Populism: A Reply to Jessop et al., 151 NEW LEFT REVIEW 115, 
120 (1985) [hereinafter Hall, Authoritarian Populism.]. 
 97.  For example, CLS offered an incisive critique of law and economics, exposing much of the 
logic I am describing: See, e.g., Mark Kelman, Choice and Utility, 1979 WIS. L. REV. 769 (1979); Mark 
Kelman, Consumption Theory, Production Theory, and Ideology in the Coase Theorem, 52 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 669 (1978–79); Duncan Kennedy & Frank Michelman, Are Property and Contract Efficient?, 8 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 711 (1979). 
 98.  Bernard Harcourt, Martha McCluskey, and a number of scholars working in comparative law 
and law and development are among these exceptions in the American legal academy. 
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neoliberalism as a political rationality has been excluded from the legal 
academy generally, despite its prominence in related fields such as political and 
critical theory. 
Hegemony is most concisely defined as constituting the “common sense” of 
an age.99 A paradigm’s status as common sense indicates more than its 
ubiquity—it indicates a particular form of power: 
You cannot learn, through common sense, how things are: you can only discover 
where they fit into the existing scheme of things. In this way, its very taken-for-
grantedness is what establishes it as a medium in which its own premises and 
presuppositions are being rendered invisible by its apparent transparency.
100
 
Not every successful or even dominant paradigm attains such widespread 
acceptance as to constitute the ground on which most political conversations 
from both the left and the right stand, but this is precisely what it means to say 
that a paradigm has become “hegemonic.”101 No longer merely a theory or even 
an ideology, its ideas become inseparable from a set of actions, institutions, and 
a mode of governance.102 Hegemony’s power works through consent, not 
persuasion; it does not entail rejection of an alternative on principle, but an 
assumption of the impossibility of an alternative. Furthermore, in the realm of 
ideas, it is as much, if not more, about what one cannot say—what is not legible 
or “rational”—than openly articulated “ideological” claims. It entails the 
cleansing of the public discourse of certain claims. For instance, “Thatcherism 
made it part of the common sense that you can’t calculate common interest.”103 
Hegemony functions not only through internalized common sense but also 
through a “scholastic program” (a set of principles advanced by a sector of 
intellectuals).104 Although neoliberal rationality should not be reduced to or 
conflated with the theory of law and economics, the latter’s meteoric rise and 
proliferation within the legal academy are undeniably symptomatic of 
neoliberalism’s dominance, as well as an instrument of its dissemination. 
Therefore, law and economics provides insight into the functioning of this 
 
 99.  This understanding of cultural hegemony is rooted in the work of Antonio Gramsci and Stuart 
Hall. Hall, Authoritarian Populism, supra note 96. See also Edward Greer, Antonio Gramsci and “Legal 
Hegemony,” in THE POLITICS OF LAW 304–09 (David Kairys ed., 1st ed. 1982). 
 100.  Stuart Hall, Culture, the Media, and the Ideological Effect, in MASS COMMUNICATION AND 
SOCIETY 315, 326 (James Curran et al. eds., 1979). 
 101.  I do not mean to imply absolute closure. Hegemony is always at least to some degree contested 
and contestable—the hegemonic paradigm always contains contradictions and resistances within it. 
 102.  The concept of hegemony refuses the distinction of the realm of ideas and the material 
relations undergirding those ideas. Therefore, although due to my focus on the discourses surrounding 
legal theory’s decline, I am foregrounding the political-ideological dimension of hegemony, in 
accordance with Antonio Gramsci’s articulation of the concept, and Stuart Hall’s further elaboration of 
it, I believe firmly in the historical and materialist aspects of hegemony: “[hegemony is] impossible to 
conceptualize or achieve without ‘the decisive nucleus of economic activity.’” Hall, supra note 96, at 
120. And so this story of neoliberalism’s hegemonic rise is incomplete without an account of the process 
of economic globalization; however, it is beyond the scope of this discursive project. 
 103.  Stuart Hall & Doreen Massey, Interpreting the Crisis, in THE NEOLIBERAL CRISIS 55, 59 
(Jonathan Rutherford & Sally Davison eds., 2012). 
 104.  CARL BOGGS, GRAMSCI’S MARXISM 39 (1976). 
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scholastic program. For one, it is important to recognize the nexus of money 
and prestige in the legal academy undergirding law and economics’ ascent, 
because to elide the two reinforces “a liberal convention of awkward silence 
about the political economy of legal theory.”105 The most obvious example is the 
Olin Foundation, which had a profound role in bringing the law and economics 
movement into elite law schools.106 
However, as important as the law and economics movement has been to the 
championing of neoliberal ideology, the more profound effects of neoliberalism 
in the academy have occurred in those areas that are not immediately 
recognized as law and economics scholarship. In those areas this rationality has 
huge but unrecognized and therefore uncontested influence.107 Neoliberalism’s 
power, therefore, is at least partially derived from its invisibility. 
On one level, neoliberalism’s hegemony is the premise for my project: legal 
theory has failed to recognize a hegemonic shift—it has failed to historicize its 
project and recognize that the dominant legal paradigm has changed. But on 
another level, hegemony itself is what legal theory has missed, treating 
instantiations of neoliberal rationality as distinct theories or models. Failure to 
recognize hegemony on this level means neglecting to put the pieces together to 
reveal the larger logic, and a failure to see the depth of its entrenchment. 
Critical legal scholars may have offered incisive critiques of law and economics 
as a theory, but they failed to recognize some of its tenets as organizing much 
more of our world and inherent in a far broader swath of legal scholarship than 
law and economics. 
V 
LEGAL THEORY THROUGH THE LENS OF NEOLIBERALISM: A 
SYMPTOMATOLOGY 
Viewing the narratives of decline in light of neoliberalism allows one to 
reconcile their contradictions—to see each narrative as true on its own terms 
and yet incomplete for understanding the fate of critical legal theory. In this 
 
 105.  Martha T. McCluskey, Thinking With Wolves: Left Legal Theory After the Right’s Rise, 54 
BUFF. L. REV. 1191, 1229 (2006). 
 106.  Id. at 1215 (“By the end of the twentieth century, the Olin Foundation, under William E. 
Simon's leadership, had made an ‘investment’ of around $50 million in ‘law-and-economics’ 
scholarship.” (citing WILLIAM E. SIMON, A TIME FOR REFLECTION: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 272 
(2004)). See also id. at 1215–22 (describing the more aggressive strategies of conservative foundations 
as compared to their liberal or left-leaning counterparts); STEPHEN M. TELES, THE RISE OF THE 
CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT: THE BATTLE FOR CONTROL OF THE LAW 103, 182–91 (2008) 
(detailing the role of the Olin Foundation in the rise of law and economics and the founding of George 
Mason Law School as a specialized law school for law and economics research). 
 107.  Michael D. Murray, After the Great Recession: Law and Economics’ Topics of Invention and 
Arrangement & Tropes of Style, 58 LOY. L. REV. 897. 919 (2012). See also Michael D. Murray, The 
Great Recession and the Rhetorical Canons of Law and Economics, 58 LOY. L. REV. 615, 619  (“The 
fact that law and economics is persuasive beyond the confirmed members of the discipline is supported 
by modern history: critics and supporters alike agree that law and economics has established itself as 
the dominant and most influential contemporary mode of analysis among American legal scholars.”).  
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part, I argue that each narrative should be understood as a symptom of 
neoliberalism’s rise. To read the narratives symptomatically means to take each 
of them as offering a descriptive insight but to not accept any of them as 
identifying the fundamental cause of legal theory’s decline. I proceed in order 
through the narratives to illustrate the ways in which each reflects, without 
explicitly recognizing and accounting for, neoliberalism’s logic.108 In short, I will 
read these narratives of decline as constituting a symptomatology. 
A. Re-evaluating “Victory” 
The victory narrative focuses on the incorporation of three of the crits’ 
primary critiques into contemporary mainstream accounts: (1) the 
indeterminacy critique, (2) the refutation of the law–politics distinction, and (3) 
the critique of the legal subject and other universal principles in liberal theory. 
These were the three sites where the crits found traction with respect to legal 
liberalism. Part III addressed the compatibility of the indeterminacy critique 
with law and economics.109 Therefore, this part focuses on the commensurability 
of the other two critiques with neoliberalism’s logic. However, under 
neoliberalism, the rules of the game have changed, and these critiques, once 
radical, are no longer truly oppositional.110 Thus, the shift from liberalism to 
neoliberalism explains why these critiques could be folded into mainstream 
accounts without threatening the law’s legitimacy, and also why the crits’ 
supposed “victory” feels so hollow. 
1. New Legitimacy and the Law–Politics Distinction 
A new model of legal legitimacy under neoliberalism provides insight into 
why the dissolution of the law–politics distinction and the critique of the legal 
subject could be folded into the contemporary dominant discourse without 
problem or questions when under the liberal paradigm they constituted a form 
of radical critique. In short, by altering the very terms of the law’s legitimacy 
this paradigm shift cuts the legs out from under the critique of the law–politics 
distinction and neuters the once incisive critique of the myth of the autonomous 
liberal subject. 
 
 108. Constructing a symptomatology from these narratives exposes, among other things, that 
neoliberalism is not a reality that critical legal theory has already recognized and accounted for, as one 
might be inclined to believe. That the crits offered critiques that exposed and challenged what I have 
identified as neoliberal rationality in specific law and economics theories or models is not equal to the 
kind of recognition and reckoning I am advocating. The narratives of decline show that critical legal 
scholars today are not seeing the whole picture even when they effectively critique the logic in 
circumscribed ways. 
 109.  See supra notes 32–34 and accompanying text. See also Eric Engle, The Fake Revolution: 
Understanding Legal Realism, 47 WASHBURN L. REV. 653, 666 (2008) (describing law and economics as 
taming of the radical potential of the crits’ indeterminacy critique “as an instrumentality of the very 
capitalism, which it had only recently, if briefly, questioned”). 
 110.  For a general discussion of the confluence of Hayek’s theories and CLS’s critiques written by a 
law and economics scholar see Linda A. Schwartzstein, Austrian Economics and the Current Debate 
between Critical Legal Studies and Law and Economics, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1105 (1992). 
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Under liberalism, the freedom, rationality, and participation of the 
autonomous citizen-subject in the democratic process were the grounds of the 
state’s democratic legitimacy.111 Each time the state actively intervened on 
behalf of capital, for example, there was potential for a “legitimation crisis”—
law’s claims of neutrality were undermined as it was shown to be serving 
interests other than those sanctioned by the governed.112 Under the neoliberal 
paradigm, in contrast, the state’s intervention on behalf of capital is no longer 
an exploitable moment for critique: “[Independence from social and economic 
powers] is the criterion for legitimacy that neoliberalism overcomes by casting 
the state as an extension of the market . . . or a form of the market.”113 Market 
growth is the precondition of individual flourishing and the state should 
intervene on behalf of capital to preserve this liberty of its subjects. Therefore, 
law is not something that stands above politics, responsive only to the 
democratic process; it is something that can be used tactically in service of 
political or economic interests so long as it preserves the market and the liberty 
of its subjects. 
Critique of liberalism’s myth of the whole, rational, and politically engaged 
subject is likewise less salient because the authority of the state is no longer 
grounded in democratic authority but in its duty to enable this particular model 
of entrepreneurial liberty.114 Although antidemocratic in a theoretical sense 
because the government wields authority not expressly granted to it by the 
people, this vision of government is generally accepted by the populace at 
large.115 
The extent to which that state cares for or responds to its subjects has also 
 
 111.  See JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 53 (C.B. Macpherson ed., 1980) 
(“And thus that, which begins and actually constitutes any political society, is nothing but the consent 
of any number of freeman capable of a majority to unite and incorporate into such a society.”) 
 112.  Brown, supra note 14, at 143 n.6. 
 113.  Id. 
 114.  The economy is the top issue cited by voters in determining how they cast their ballots, 
followed closely by unemployment. See Jeffrey M. Jones, Economy is Paramount Issue to U.S. Voters, 
GALLUP (Feb. 29, 2012), http://www.gallup.com/poll/153029/economy-paramount-issue-voters.aspx (In 
the 2012 presidential election, more than nine out of ten voters reported that the economy was 
“extremely important” or “very important” to their vote). 
 115.  Two recent studies illustrate the extent that the mindset regarding inequality has shifted and 
the neoliberal suspicion of big government has taken hold. A recent poll conducted by Bloomberg 
found that although Americans almost two to one (64 to 33 percent) say that the United States no 
longer offers everyone the equal chance to get ahead (the social mobility that has for so long be core of 
the so-called “American dream”), 44 percent of Americans still think it would be better for the market 
to be allowed operate freely than to have the government intervene even if that means the gap gets 
wider. See David J. Lynch, Americans Say Dream Fading as Income Gap Hurts Chances, BLOOMBERG 
(Dec. 11, 2013, 12:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-12-11/americans-say-dream-fading-
as-income-gap-hurts-chances.html. This faith in the market in spite of its consequences is part and 
parcel of neoliberal rationality. A recent Gallup poll paints an even starker picture of the acceptance of 
neoliberal premises by members of both political parties. The poll indicates that 72 percent of 
Americans believe “big government” is the greatest threat to country in the future, the highest 
percentage ever recorded by a significant margin. Jeffrey M. Jones, Record High in U.S. Say Big 
Government Greatest Threat, GALLUP, (Dec. 18, 2013), http://www.gallup.com/poll/166535/record-high-
say-big-government-greatest-threat.aspx. 
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been displaced as a central metric for measuring its efficacy or legitimacy. In the 
shift from the nation-state to the market-state, the question is no longer one of 
whether the government improves the welfare of the people, but is instead 
“whether [the government’s] policies improve and expand the opportunities 
offered to the public.”116 Illustrating that the state is not improving the welfare 
of its subjects is no longer destabilizing because responsibility has been shifted 
down to the individual. 
Exposing the distance between liberal ideals and current realities (the 
materialist critique) has lost some of its force because neoliberalism has 
redefined these ideals in such a way as to give the illusion of achievement. The 
concept of equality is a clear example: liberalism did not have a means to 
explain the gap between formal equality and substantive equality and therefore 
could be called into question on those grounds (as the crits did very 
effectively).117 Neoliberalism, by contrast, has an answer; it redefines equality as 
equal choice (or equal amounts of entrepreneurial liberty) and places any 
failures in that arena firmly with the individual. One’s choices are restricted by 
one’s own merit and by one’s prior choices, not by systemic or structural 
inequalities. Because neoliberalism redefines such liberal concepts, as opposed 
to jettisoning them, there is an illusion of continuity: if neoliberalism openly 
disavowed the importance of the ideal then it would register as a break. Instead, 
neoliberalism redefines all other values in terms of liberty, which obfuscates this 
change, making many believe it in fact preserves these liberal values when it 
meets its own criteria. 
That class falls out of the victory narrative is also symptomatic of the shift in 
logic that makes material inequalities not the product of law but of individual 
choices. If material inequality is the product of individual choices and talents, 
law is no longer responsible for addressing the resulting inequalities. 
Furthermore, according to Hayek’s theory, the state is not capable of 
successfully intervening in the economic realm even if the market’s allocations 
are unjust. 
2. Multiculturalism and the Critique of Universals 
The current “multiculturalism” of the legal academy is sometimes held up as 
another victory for critical legal scholarship: “The legal academy has been 
transformed, with a strong ideology of liberal centrism displaced by an almost 
equally strong pluralist ideology that tolerates a range of ideas wide enough to 
encompass those that would have been called critical legal studies at an earlier 
point.”118 Much of the leftist critique in the second half of the twentieth century 
was indeed focused on debunking the illusion of universal values, revealing how 
claims to universality furthered the values of the dominant race, class, or 
 
 116.  Brown, supra note 14, at 222. 
 117.  See David Kairys, Introduction, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE (David 
Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1998). 
 118.  Tushnet, supra note 1, at 111. 
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gender. Neoliberalism’s abandonment of these claims to universality, and even 
more so its embrace of their impossibility, provides insight into why these 
critiques no longer have the force they once did. 
The refutation of universal values is a premise shared between the critical 
legal project and neoliberalism.119 Hayek’s vision of the neoliberal state is 
explicitly premised on the impossibility of enacting a monolithic set of shared 
social values; he draws his distinction between the market state and the 
collectivist state precisely along these lines. The market state has the virtue of 
not needing to appeal to transcendent values, Hayek argues, whereas 
collectivist frameworks presuppose “the existence of a complete ethical code in 
which all the different human values are allotted their due place.”120 The 
neoliberal state invokes a pluralist society in which each group can pursue its 
own values and interests, which are then merely aggregated. This is particularly 
appealing in the age of identify politics and the recognition of difference. More 
than not requiring it, neoliberalism capitalizes on our experience of the 
impossibility of value consensus. Thus, the legal academy’s multiculturalism can 
be as a symptom of neoliberalism’s rationality. 
B. “There Is No Alternative”: Rethinking The Failure Narrative 
Failure to provide an alternative, one of the central indictments of the crits, 
reflects both a formal and substantive element of neoliberal hegemony: the 
absence of any alternative. As an initial matter, the inability to offer an 
alternative is a formal aspect of neoliberal hegemony insofar as hegemony 
functions as common sense, denying the possibility of another logic. But the 
absence of an alternative is a substantive premise of neoliberalism as well. 
Margaret Thatcher even coined the slogan: TINA (“there is no alternative”).121 
Furthermore, in Hayek’s theory, limits on societal knowledge, combined with 
the delicate ecology of the spontaneous order of society and the market, make 
ambitions to seek out an alternative not only futile but also potentially 
destructive. The crits failed to offer an alternative to capitalist democracy, but 
they did so precisely at this “end of history” moment when the possibility of an 
alternative itself is being denied, and from which it is easier to imagine the end 
of the world than the end of market capitalism.122 
This assumption that there is no alternative to the democratic market-state 
 
 119.  See Jodi Melamed, The Spirit of Neoliberalism: From Racial Liberalism to Neoliberal 
Multiculturalism, in 24 SOCIAL TEXT 4, 3–8 (Winter 2006). 
 120.  HAYEK, supra note 66, at 60. 
 121.  The original source of the slogan was Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics, notably mentioned in 
Holmes’s vitriolic dissent in Lochner v. New York. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) 
(Holmes, J., dissenting) (In refusing the majority’s assertion that freedom of contract was a 
fundamental liberty, he declared, “The Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer’s 
Social Statics.”). 
 122.  FREDRIC JAMESON, THE SEEDS OF TIME xii (1996) (“It seems to be easier for us today to 
imagine the thoroughgoing deterioration of the earth and of nature than the breakdown of late 
capitalism.”). 
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gives rise to the demand that legal scholarship work within the given framework 
as opposed to attempting to challenge or think outside of it. The instrumentalist 
demand for legal scholarship to be “useful” can therefore also be seen as 
symptomatic of neoliberal hegemony. This demand is not only directed toward 
the crits but throughout the legal academy, as legal academics eschew theory, 
reflexivity, and critique in favor of applied and technocratic projects that 
function within the system.123 “The message of neoliberalism is one that values 
applied knowledge over theoretical or doctrinal knowledge—‘know how’ over 
‘know what’. . . . Critical and theoretical knowledge of all kinds has been 
contracted in favor of vocationalism.”124 Instrumental forms of legal scholarship 
are more successful within the academic market, especially as the academy is 
pressured to focus more on supporting the legal profession at large.125 
Identifying this relationship between instrumentalism and neoliberalism also 
provides insight into why the specialization narrative is symptomatic. Hackney’s 
“toolkit” metaphor puts a positive valence on the characterization of theories as 
instruments. The abandonment of legal theory as its own field in favor of 
concrete applications of theory fits neatly within neoliberalism’s logic that value 
only comes from working within the current framework. 
C. Putting The Pieces Back Together: The Contingency Of The Identity–Class 
Opposition 
The balkanization narrative asserts that materialist and class politics were 
abandoned in favor of identity projects through the rise of CRT and feminist 
legal theory.126 In so doing, this narrative assumes a fundamental antagonism 
between materialist-distributive concerns and identity politics. This binary is 
again symptomatic of neoliberal thought. The crits did break apart into 
theoretical subfields along these lines; but the antagonism between projects of 
redistribution (class) and recognition (identity) is historically contingent. The 
perceived incompatibility is premised on a separation of the cultural from the 
economic at the heart of neoliberalism; prior to the rise of neoliberalism 
materialist and identity politics were seen as fully compatible. 
A conception of identity divorced from materiality is compatible with, if not 
constituent of, neoliberal logic. Under neoliberalism there is an emerging 
“rhetorical commitment to diversity, and to a narrow, formal, non-redistributive 
form of ‘equality’ politics for the new millennium.”127 However, it does not 
 
 123.  Margaret Thornton, The New Knowledge Economy and the Transformation of the Law 
Discipline, 19 INT’L J. OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 265, 273 (2012). 
 124.  Id. 
 125.  See, e.g., Adam Liptak, The Lackluster Reviews that Lawyers Love to Hate, NY TIMES (Oct. 21, 
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/22/us/law-scholarships-lackluster-reviews.html; David Segal, 
What They Don’t Teach Law Students: Lawyering, NY TIMES (Nov. 19, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/20/business/after-law-school-associates-learn-to-be-lawyers.html. 
 126.  See supra notes 47– 49 and accompanying text. 
 127.  LISA DUGGAN, TWILIGHT OF EQUALITY?: NEOLIBERALISM, CULTURAL POLITICS, AND THE 
ATTACK ON DEMOCRACY 44 (2003). 
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follow that all identity claims or claims of recognition are inherently compatible 
with neoliberalism and therefore necessarily complicit in its logic. Nancy Fraser 
argues that although the conflict between the two is not a natural or necessary 
relation.128 She argues that the solution is not to abandon identity claims 
because certain forms of “recognition” are truly emancipatory and because 
culture is a necessary terrain of struggle. “[R]ecognition” can retain and 
integrate the materialist issues of redistribution.129 
That said, currently, identity is eclipsing the materialist conversation. Insofar 
as the identity discourses enable people to identify themselves as socially 
progressive but fiscally conservative, they reinforce the neoliberal construction 
that these are in fact distinct realms—that the social can be divorced from the 
economic. This is the position the Court has taken, and the legal academy has 
followed suit. An examination of the equal protection doctrine illustrates this 
point. 
The legacy of the Warren Court has been taken up in the popular 
consciousness and, more importantly, in the legal academy as being about the 
protection of “insular minorities” or identity groups.130 However, in focusing on 
this debate, legal scholars have not preserved the Warren Court’s concept of 
protection.131 “[T]oday in modern America, inequality is discussed as the natural 
byproduct of the differing interests, talents, and education that individuals bring 
to that mysterious thing political economists and neo-classical economists alike 
refer to as the ‘market.’”132 Even in terms of affirmative action or welfare, the 
focus is on enabling the traditionally excluded group’s participation in the 
market. How did society go from a moment in which even the Supreme Court 
appeared to be laying the groundwork for the poor to be considered a suspect 
class to one in which the poor are excluded not only from the equal protection 
doctrine, but from legal theory discourse as well? Materialism may have fallen 
out of the Court’s equal protection analysis, but that is not a justification for 
legal scholarship to accept its exclusion. The legal academy is participating in 
the ideology of erasure insofar as the academy has accepted and reinforces that 
disparate impact and other materially inflected concepts of equal protection are 
 
 128.  Nancy Fraser, Rethinking Recognition, NEW LEFT REVIEW 108–09 (2000). Fraser identifies a 
proliferation of “recognition claims” and the displacement of redistribution claims in the face of 
neoliberalism’s rhetorical assault, the end of socialism, and doubts about even the possibility of state-
Keynesian social democracy in the face of globalization. Id. at 108. 
 129.  Id. 
 130.  See generally Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in 
Constitutional Struggles Over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470 (2004). In recent years, leftist legal 
scholars have fought to preserve and even expand the equal protection of identity-based minorities 
under an antisubordination rubric as opposed to a colorblind rubric. 
 131.  See Frank I. Michelman, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7 (1969) (carefully illustrating that the rejection of material 
considerations in favor of a focus on the intention to discriminate was not necessarily the path laid out 
by the Warren Court). 
 132.  Athena Mutua, Introducing Class Crits: From Class Blindness to a Critical Legal Analysis of 
Economic Inequality, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 859, 861 (2008). 
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“off the wall.”133 
VI 
RECOVERING LEGAL THEORY’S RELEVANCE? 
The lens of neoliberalism not only allows one to see how these narratives fit 
together to reveal a larger rationality but also to understand why the solutions 
they propose fail to challenge or even escape that rationality. I address the 
three most prominent prescriptions being offered by critical legal scholars 
today: (1) a pragmatic turn to politics, (2) a return to more explicit normative 
and moral claims, and (3) acceptance in recognition that the decline is merely 
an ebb in the regular cycles of theory. 
A. Prescription: More Politics 
The most common prescription for recovering legal theory’s vibrancy is a 
greater participation in politics—scholars should eschew descriptive projects, 
especially those that might be used to bolster the conservative argument on an 
issue or in a case, as well as those critiques that appear purely academic, in 
favor of projects intended to influence the courts in progressive ways.134 One can 
certainly understand why this is a tempting prescription in light of the success of 
explicitly conservative legal theory and methods135 and concern that left-leaning 
legal academics have not taken up this charge.136 However, this demand for 
political engagement has unintended consequences: It legitimizes the current 
frameworks. As the Roberts Court further embraces neoliberal principles, 
persuading the Court means functioning within neoliberal logic and is therefore 
counterproductive for the revitalization of critical legal theory. 
Moreover, this political prescription tends to produce a reified notion of 
 
 133.  Jack M. Balkin, “Wrong on the Day It Was Decided”: Lochner and Constitutional Historicism, 
85 B.U. L. REV. 677, 679 (2005) (“[C]onventions determining what is a good or bad legal argument 
about the Constitution, what is a plausible legal claim, and what is ‘off-the-wall’ change over time in 
response to changing social, political, and historical conditions”). 
 134.  See, e.g., Siedman, supra note 31, at 588–92 (advocating for current critical legal scholars to 
form political alliances with rule-of-law liberals and conservatives against creeping authoritarianism); 
Richard Delgado, Crossroads and Blind Alleys: A Critical Examination of Recent Writing About Race, 
82 TEX. L. REV. 121 (2003) (book review) (urging CRT to turn away from high theory and discourse 
about racial justice to focus on strategies for harnessing and redirecting the material interests of those 
who benefit from white privilege). 
 135.  McCluskey, supra note 105, at 1194 (“An explosion of visionary legal theory challenging a 
century of non-conservative law reform has helped drive the right-wing’s political success.”). See 
generally TELES, supra note 106 (describing in detail the rise of the conservative legal movement, 
starting in the 1970s through present day). 
 136.  See Simon, supra note 2, at 181 (arguing that “the cost of the antipolitcal impulse in the liberal 
academy has been the diminution in the intellectual resources available for nonconservative politics”); 
see also Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Democratic Constitutionalism, in THE CONSTITUTION IN 2020 
33 (Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2009) (arguing the left has much to learn from the right in 
this regard: “The recent conservative mobilization teaches that authority flows to those who can relate 
the Constitution’s fundamental commitments to the beliefs and concerns that animate the American 
people and who can identify those modes of argument that this vision its most powerful legal form.”). 
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what counts as politics, limiting the political as well as intellectual potential of 
theoretical projects. For example, in the wake of the of the Court’s incremental 
move toward recognition of same-sex marriage in United States v. Windsor,137 
many progressive legal scholars have written on the subject hoping to nudge the 
Court toward full recognition. But in light of Nancy Fraser’s work, one should 
ask just what kind of recognition that would be—whether it would displace 
materialist claims or reify forms of identity.138 Full recognition of same-sex 
marriage is a destination toward which the Court is already heading and an area 
where the public discourse has largely already arrived. Emphasizing this area 
also participates in the ideology of erasure, leading many to believe that the 
current Court is making progressive interventions because it is progressive on 
identity and cultural issues, even though Windsor was handed down in a term in 
which the Court retrenched on significant materialist issues and embodied a 
number of blatantly neoliberal positions.139 
Even if not writing for the Court, a legal scholar’s attempt to be useful to 
those in the profession who share her political goals risks constraining the legal 
profession and its own professional and disciplinary norms.140 In this way, the 
focus on concrete political effects helps foster legal thought’s “considerable 
capacity for resisting self-reflection and analysis,”141 which has only become 
more pronounced in the face of the neoliberalization of the academy as 
instrumental knowledge is increasingly privileged. When attempting to counter 
hegemony, what one needs to do is disrupt the legible—to expand the contours 
of what is considered political—not to accept the narrowly circumscribed zone 
of politics neoliberalism demarcates. Therefore, it is crucial not to judge critical 
legal scholarship according to whether its political impact is immediate or even 
known, and thus a turn to politics is not the remedy for legal theory’s 
marginalization. 
B. Prescription: More Normativity 
Some scholars recognize the danger of embracing a reified notion of politics 
 
 137.  133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
 138.  See supra notes 128–29 and accompanying text. 
 139.  See, e.g., Am. Express v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013), in which the Court 
held that the “effective vindication” exception does not guarantee the right to class arbitrations even if 
the case would be prohibitively expensive for a single party to pursue, such as in antitrust cases. 
According to Scalia’s opinion for the majority, access to the courts only has to be hypothetically 
possible: “the fact that it is not worth the expense involved in proving a statutory remedy does not 
constitute the elimination of the right to pursue that remedy.” Id. at 2311. In the Court’s reasoning in 
Italian Colors, we see the neoliberal model of choice insofar as it refuses to account for the ways 
material realities and inequalities constrain choice; see Erwin Chemerinsky, Justice for Big Business, 
NY TIMES (July 1, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/02/opinion/justice-for-big-business.html 
(“[I]n the final two weeks of [the term in which Windsor was handed down], the Court ruled in favor of 
big business and closed the courthouse doors to employees, consumers, and small businesses seeking 
remedy for serious injuries.”).  
 140.  Pierre Schlag, Spam Jurisprudence, Air Law, and the Rank Anxiety of Nothing Happening, 97 
GEO. L.J. 803, 813 (2009). 
 141.  Fischl, supra note 37, at 783. 
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that unwittingly reaffirms the status quo, and instead champion assertions of 
substantive morality to counteract the cold logics of pragmatism and 
efficiency.142 This proposed solution advocates a return to more substantive 
ideals of justice and equality. Although it may be true that change will 
ultimately require wresting these liberal and democratic ideals from 
neoliberalism and refilling their hollowed-out forms, this approach entails a 
number of pitfalls. 
The first is simply the inevitable question regarding moral claims: Whose 
morality is to be asserted? This question has created crisis on the left before, 
even producing some of the schisms among the crits recounted above. 
Neoliberalism does not have to contend with this issue—it foregrounds its 
formal nature and holds itself out as not needing to create a universal morality 
or set of values. More importantly, it claims to provide a structure in which one 
can keep one’s own substantive morals. Therefore, neoliberalism’s logic cannot 
be countered by moral claims without first disrupting its illusion of amorality. 
The ineffectiveness of the progressive critique of law and economics, based 
in claims of distributive justice and moral imperative, provides a clear example 
of how the neoliberal discourse can capture normative claims. The work of 
Martha McCluskey, one of the few legal scholars writing about neoliberalism in 
the domestic context over the last ten years, highlights the extent to which the 
“distributive justice” critique, which argues against the privileging of efficiency 
over equality and redistribution, fails to challenge the underlying logic.143 
McCluskey illustrates how critics of law and economics who critique the 
approach’s inattention to redistribution have already ceded the central point, by 
arguing within the conventional views that “efficiency is about expanding the 
societal pie [and] redistribution [is] about dividing it.”144 “Neoliberalism’s 
disadvantage is not, as most critics worry, its inattention to redistribution, but to 
the contrary, its very obsession with redistribution as a distinctly seductive yet 
treacherous policy separate from efficiency.”145 In order to challenge this 
rationality, she explains, one cannot “misconstrue neoliberalism as a project to 
promote individual freedom and value-neutral economics at the expense of 
social responsibility and community morality.”146 One must instead recognize 
that neoliberalism has redefined social responsibility and community morality. 
Therefore, one must refuse the false dichotomy between the economic and 
cultural spheres (a division that allows the neoliberal discourse to displace 
 
 142.  See, e.g., Gabel, supra note 2, at 532 (claiming “if CLS would embrace the moral and spiritual 
agenda [he proposes], it would instantly revitalize itself.”); WEST, supra note 61. 
 143.  See generally Martha T. McCluskey, Efficiency and Social Citizenship: Challenging the 
Neoliberal Attack on the Welfare State, 78 IND. L.J. 783 (2003). 
 144.  Id. at 787. Members of CLS did, and some still do, offer precisely the critiques that McCluskey 
is advocating however they fail to connect them up to the legal discourse more generally. And CLS 
scholars are the ones more than any of the other crits that have been marginalized, relegated to the 
clinics, etc. 
 145.  Id. at 787–88. 
 146.  Id. at 798. 
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cultural concerns to a moment after the economic concerns have been dealt 
with). Merely asserting the falsity of this separation is not sufficient. 
Neoliberalism has real effects in the world that strengthen its ideological 
claims.147 Therefore, it is not a struggle that can take place solely on the terrain 
of discourse or ideology. 
Like neoliberalism generally, law and economics does not hold itself out as 
infallible or as an embodiment of social ideals, but instead as the best society 
can do. It functions precisely on the logic that there is no alternative. Like 
Hayek’s theory, “[l]aw and [e]conomics is full of stories about how liberal rights 
and regulation designed to advance equality victimize the all-powerful market, 
undermining its promised rewards.”148 In light of this, it is a mistake to see 
neoliberalism as disavowing moral principles in favor of economic ones; it 
instead folds them into one another: “[T]he Law and Economics movement is 
rooted in the moral ideal of the market as the social realization of individual 
liberty and popular democracy.”149 Neoliberalism’s approach presents itself not 
only as efficient, but also as just. Legal scholars need to recognize 
neoliberalism’s focus on the market is not only a form of morality, but also a 
powerful one. They cannot assume that in a battle of moralities the substantive 
communitarian ideal will win.150 
Furthermore, the neoliberal framework, through its reconfiguration of the 
subject as an entrepreneur, justifies material inequalities—in contrast to 
liberalism’s mere blindness to them. Consequently, merely asserting the 
existence of material inequalities does not immediately undermine 
neoliberalism’s claims. Far from the engaged citizen who actively produces the 
polis in liberal theory, the neoliberal subject is a rational, calculating, and 
independent entity “whose moral autonomy is measured by [her] capacity for 
‘self-care’—the ability to provide for [her] own needs and service [her] own 
ambitions.”151 The subject’s morality is not in relation to principles or ideals, but 
is “a matter of rational deliberation about costs, benefits, and consequences.”152  
If efficiency is the morality of our time, the poor are cast not only as 
“undeserving” but also as morally bankrupt. Therefore, efficiency replaces not 
only political morality, but also all other forms of value. Therefore, critics are 
right that other forms of value have been crowded out; but the logic is deeper 
than they seem to realize. It goes beyond the scope of what is being done in the 
 
 147.  Bernard E. Harcourt, Fantasies and Illusions: On Liberty, Order, Free Markets, 33 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 2413, 2422 (2011) (“[The ‘errors’ of law and economics] are not mere mistakes that can easily 
be corrected. The belief in free markets has produced a significant redistribution of wealth in society”). 
    148.    McCluskey, supra note 105, at 1267. 
 149.  Gabel, supra note 2, at 529. 
 150.  Harcourt, supra note 147, at 2426 (quoting DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF 
NEOLIBERALISM 5 (2005)) (“‘Concepts of dignity and individual freedom are powerful and appealing 
in their own right. Such ideals empowered the dissident movements in eastern Europe and the Soviet 
Union before the end of the Cold War as well as the students in Tiananmen Square.’”). 
 151. Brown, supra note 14, at 42. 
 152. Id. 
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legal academy. It is a logic that organizes our time and therefore must be 
countered differently. 
More normativity is not the answer to legal theory’s marginalization because 
neoliberalism’s logic can accommodate even radically contradictory moralities 
under its claims of moral pluralism. Ethical claims of justice and community 
may need to be made, but one must first recognize that countering hegemony is 
harder than merely articulating an alternative; hegemony must be disrupted 
first. Disrupting neoliberalism’s logic thus entails not only recognizing that 
neoliberalism has a morality, but also taking that morality seriously. 
C. Prescription: Acceptance 
The final response of legal theorists to their field’s marginalization is to 
dismiss it as merely the regular ebb and flow of theory’s prominence.153 Putting 
it in terms of Thomas Kuhn’s theory of paradigm shifts, the contemporary 
moment is just the “normal science” of the paradigm brought about by the crits’ 
revolutionary moment in the 1970s and 1980s.154 The vitality, this narrative 
contends, will return when a competing paradigm emerges. 
There are several problems with this perspective on the decline. First, it 
entails an error in logic insofar as it takes an external perspective. Legal theory 
does not inevitably rise and fall but only according to the work being produced; 
or, to put it another way, this descriptive account of theory’s ebb can be a self-
fulfilling prophecy insofar as it decreases scholars’ motivation to pursue and 
receptivity toward theoretical projects. Second, legal scholars cannot be content 
with normal science when it has the kinds of consequences for democracy and 
economic inequality that neoliberal hegemony does. The Court is currently 
entrenching these principles at an unprecedented rate in areas of free speech, 
equal protection, and antitrust to name a few.155 
At first, such acceptance appears to be what Janet Halley is advocating in 
“taking a break from feminism,”156 but upon closer inspection it is not. Halley is 
cautioning against the left’s nostalgia—concluding that operating under the 
banner of feminism and a preoccupation with “reviving” feminism looks 
backward instead of forward.157 Critical legal scholarship instead needs to be 
“self-critical” and to recognize that “how we make and apply legal theory arises 
out of the circumstances in which we recognize problems and articulate 
solutions.”158 Theory must arise from engagement with the current 
 
 153.  Schlag, supra note 140 (claiming academic excitement comes in waves). 
 154.  HACKNEY, supra note 1, at 16. 
 155.  Jedediah Purdy, Neoliberal Constitutionalism: Lochnerism for a New Economy, 77 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2014 at 195;  Zephyr Teachout, Neoliberal Political Law, 77 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2014 at 215. 
    156.    See generally HALLEY, supra note 50. 
 157.  See id. 
 158.  See, e.g., Jack Balkin, Critical Legal Theory Today, in ON PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICAN LAW 
64, 68 (Francis J. Mootz, III ed., 2008) (Balkin continues, “A critical theory of law must recognize how 
different aspects of law—and of a critical theory of law itself—become newly salient or refigured in 
BLALOCK_FORMATTED_CHANTBOX 12/3/2014  2:08 PM 
102 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 77:71 
circumstances. Acceptance cannot be the solution; legal theory must produce 
the momentum to move forward. 
VII 
CONCLUSION: WHERE WE GO FROM HERE 
The way forward cannot entail a return to reified notions of theory any 
more than by a return to reified notions of politics. Critical legal scholars should 
not attempt to revitalize previous critical movements but, instead, reinvigorate 
the practice of critique within the legal academy. 
A. Why Critique 
Naming neoliberalism is necessary in order to counteract it. Without explicit 
identification, there can be no truly oppositional position. It also makes legible 
connections that would otherwise go unseen, as was the case with scholars 
writing about the decline. But there must also be a step beyond naming: 
critique. 
Critique means taking neoliberal rationality seriously. The approach must 
not be dismissive, merely pointing out neoliberalism’s inconsistencies, but 
instead must recognize that neoliberal rationality is inherently appealing. One 
cannot merely indict efficiency as contrary to more substantive values, but one 
also must recognize that efficiency is inextricably tied to beliefs about liberty, 
dignity, and individual choice, as well as corresponding beliefs about the 
capacities and limits of the state to effectuate change. No one is arguing that 
neoliberalism is the best of all possible worlds; in fact, its power comes precisely 
from abandoning such a claim. In recognizing its hegemonic status, legal 
scholars can understand the critical task as being more than just 
demystification. Neoliberal does not paper over inequalities after all; it justifies 
them. 
Ultimately, critique should function as a means of opening the conversation 
in ways that go beyond the picture of law painted by the Roberts Court—to 
refuse to allow the legal academy to be merely mimetic of a Court that is clearly 
embracing a neoliberal vision. Critique provides a means of thinking about law 
as not limited by what the markets can tolerate; it is the means through which 
one can discover a form of resistance that goes beyond nostalgia for the liberal 
welfare state. And finally, critique is simply a means of asserting that things can 
be different than they are in a world that constantly insists that there is no 
alternative. 
B. Why It Is Law’s Problem 
One might wonder why, if the critique of neoliberalism is vibrant in other 
fields (particularly political theory), is it necessary that this critique exist within 
 
different circumstances, and how the seemingly timeless verities of one historical period are 
conditioned by the assumptions and expectations of that time.”). 
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the legal academy? The answer is that political theory, critical theory, and even 
the globalization discourse approach law from the external perspective. Even 
within the legal academy, the only really sustained neoliberal critique has been 
in the area of law and development—likewise often embodying an external 
perspective. And yet, the legal academy and the profession are both premised 
on the idea that law cannot be understood fully from the outside. For, one 
external critiques tend to address law only in the global sense and do not 
account for specific doctrinal developments.  
To say that neoliberal critique is legal theory’s task is not to say that it 
should be done only at a high level of abstraction. The articles in this volume 
are precisely the kind of scholarship that needs to be done: concrete projects 
that recognize the effects that neoliberal rationality has in various doctrinal and 
theoretical areas. 
But more than just being ideally situated to take on this task, neoliberalism 
is law’s problem because the law (and the legal academy, by extension) is 
complicit in its legitimation. Although based in economics, neoliberalism’s 
framework is disseminated and legitimated by the legal discourse: “Law, rather 
than economics, has become the rhetorical domain for identifying market 
failures and transactional costs, and attending to their elimination, for weighing 
and balancing institutional prerogatives, for assessing the proportionality and 
necessity of regulatory initiatives.”159 Furthermore, the law serves a legitimating 
function insofar as it hides the politics of the market’s logic as merely 
background rules.160 “Legal determinations present themselves as operations of 
logic, policy analysis, procedural necessity, economic insight, or constitutional 
commitment.”161 
Ultimately, critical legal scholarship is still attempting to challenge a legal 
discourse that no longer exists. It is attempting to derive political agency from 
liberalism’s inconsistencies, but the paradigm of legitimacy for the law has 
changed. Although the language may have stayed consistent, the structures are 
rationalized anew. Thus far, neoliberal logic has been largely impervious, even 
in the face of financial crisis when its contradictions were laid bare.162 Any viable 
critique must help to explain this resilience—and to understand law’s role in it. 
 
 
 159.  Kennedy, supra note 68, at 161. 
 160.  Bobbitt, supra note 35, at 2382 (“As we enter the Age of Consent, the era of a new, already 
emerging constitutional order that puts the maximization of individual choice at the pinnacle of public 
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 161. Kennedy, supra note 68, at 163 (offering the example of whether or not a living wage is normal 
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 162.  Hall, et al., supra note 72, at 19 (“[T]he shape of the crisis remains ‘economic’. . . . There is no 
serious crisis of ideas.”); see also MIROWSKI, supra note 92. 
